DCSync
Request account secrets through AD replication, identify the required rights, and inspect krbtgt material for subsequent ticket forgery.
Contents
1. Why the attack works
Domain controllers replicate Active Directory changes through Directory Replication Service (DRS). DCSync uses that replication interface to request account secrets from a DC, rather than reading LSASS memory on the operator’s current machine.
The important prerequisite is replication rights over the domain naming context. Domain and enterprise administrators and DC accounts commonly hold these rights, but another identity may have them delegated. Ordinary domain membership or local administrator access to a workstation is not enough.
| Right | GUID |
|---|---|
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set | 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c |
The first two rights are central to secret replication in this workflow; the filtered-set right is relevant to applicable filtered attributes. Their GUIDs are distinct.
2. Request krbtgt secrets
beacon> getuid
# Confirm the effective identity before requesting replication.
beacon> dcsync contoso.com CONTOSO\krbtgt
# Inspect the returned account SID, NTLM hash and available AES128/AES256 keys.Beacon’s dcsync invokes Mimikatz replication functionality. The operation needs connectivity to the domain’s replication interfaces and an identity with the required rights. Select the intended account instead of treating this as a local cache dump.
3. Interpret the material
| Output | Use |
|---|---|
| Account SID | Identifies the replicated account; the final RID is not part of the domain SID |
| NTLM hash | RC4 key material where the environment supports that encryption type |
| AES128 / AES256 | Kerberos key material for the corresponding encryption type |
| Current and historical material | Keep track of which key/version is being used |
krbtgt protects domain TGTs. Its key enables the Golden and Diamond workflows; it is not the service account key used to construct an ordinary Silver Ticket. A krbtgt SID ends with RID 502; remove the account RID when a tool asks for the domain SID.
4. Verification and troubleshooting
| Symptom | Check |
|---|---|
| Access denied | Effective token and replication rights on the domain root |
| RPC or server error | Domain/DC discovery, DNS, network reachability and RPC filtering |
| Desired key missing | Selected account, available encryption material and returned key versions |
| Forged ticket rejected afterward | Key type, key version, identity fields and KDC validation; successful DCSync is not a ticket-acceptance test |
5. Detection and remediation
Investigate replication from hosts that are not DCs. Event 4662, with the relevant directory auditing and SACLs, can record use of replication rights. Correlate the requesting identity and source host; DRS traffic alone is normal between DCs.
Remove unjustified replication rights and treat extracted secrets as compromised. For krbtgt, recovery requires a coordinated key-reset procedure accounting for both current and previous keys; changing only the compromised administrator’s password does not invalidate stolen krbtgt material.