AD CS Enumeration and Certificate Authentication
Identify certification authorities, published templates, enrollment rights, certificate usages and the prerequisites for ESC1–ESC4, ESC8 and Golden Certificates.
Contents
1. How the components fit together
AD CS issues X.509 certificates that bind public keys to identities. A template controls what can be requested; the issuing CA controls whether it is issued; the authenticating service or KDC decides whether to trust and map it to an account.
| Item | What to inspect |
|---|---|
| CA FullName | Host and CA name used for requests |
| Published templates | Whether the intended CA actually issues the template |
| Enroll permissions | Whether the current principal can request it |
| Subject and SAN | Whether identity comes from AD or the requester |
| EKU / application policies | Authentication, Any Purpose or enrollment-agent capability |
| Issuance requirements | Manager approval and authorized signatures |
| Template ACL | Effective rights to change properties, owner or DACL |
| Web enrollment | Authentication methods, TLS and Extended Protection |
| Authentication mapping | Whether the KDC can securely associate the certificate with the account |
2. Find CAs and templates
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Certify\Certify\bin\Release\Certify.exe enum-cas --quiet
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Certify\Certify\bin\Release\Certify.exe enum-templates --filter-enabled --filter-vulnerable --hide-admins --quietThe command syntax follows the Certify version in the notes. Record the actual CA FullName, template name, effective permissions and endpoint. Re-run without --hide-admins when inspecting administrative ACLs; the filtered view is not a complete security review.
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Certify\Certify\bin\Release\Certify.exe enum-templates --template <TEMPLATE_NAME> --quiet3. Select the path
| Finding | Next reference |
|---|---|
| Authentication-capable template plus requester-controlled identity | ESC1 |
| Any Purpose or absent EKU restrictions | ESC2 |
| Enrollment-agent certificate and an accepting target template | ESC3 |
| Effective template modification rights | ESC4 |
| Relayable NTLM web enrollment | ESC8 |
| Access to a usable CA signing private key | Golden Certificates |
An ESC label is a candidate configuration, not confirmation of impersonation. CA issuance, account mapping and service authorization are separate checks.
4. Useful EKUs
| Usage | OID |
|---|---|
| Client Authentication | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 |
| Certificate Request Agent | 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1 |
| Any Purpose | 2.5.29.37.0 |
| Server Authentication | 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 |
A certificate’s public key is not its private key. A certificate-only export is insufficient for the PFX authentication examples.
5. Certificate mapping matters
Current Windows DC enforcement requires strong certificate-to-account mapping. A chosen UPN alone is not proof that a certificate issued to one account will authenticate as another. Inspect the certificate SID extension and configured mappings when the lab’s UPN-only examples fail; do not assume that changing the UPN changes a CA-generated SID binding. See Microsoft KB5014754.
Quick checklist
[ ] Enumerate CAs and record FullName, trust and enrollment endpoints.
[ ] Enumerate published templates and effective enrollment permissions.
[ ] Check identity controls, EKUs, approval and authorized signatures.
[ ] Inspect template ACLs separately from CA permissions.
[ ] Select an attack path only after validating all prerequisites.
[ ] Verify issuance and KDC acceptance as distinct outcomes.