Available

Search posts

AD CS Enumeration and Certificate Authentication

Identify certification authorities, published templates, enrollment rights, certificate usages and the prerequisites for ESC1–ESC4, ESC8 and Golden Certificates.

Contents

1. How the components fit together

AD CS issues X.509 certificates that bind public keys to identities. A template controls what can be requested; the issuing CA controls whether it is issued; the authenticating service or KDC decides whether to trust and map it to an account.

ItemWhat to inspect
CA FullNameHost and CA name used for requests
Published templatesWhether the intended CA actually issues the template
Enroll permissionsWhether the current principal can request it
Subject and SANWhether identity comes from AD or the requester
EKU / application policiesAuthentication, Any Purpose or enrollment-agent capability
Issuance requirementsManager approval and authorized signatures
Template ACLEffective rights to change properties, owner or DACL
Web enrollmentAuthentication methods, TLS and Extended Protection
Authentication mappingWhether the KDC can securely associate the certificate with the account

2. Find CAs and templates

shell
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Certify\Certify\bin\Release\Certify.exe enum-cas --quiet
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Certify\Certify\bin\Release\Certify.exe enum-templates --filter-enabled --filter-vulnerable --hide-admins --quiet

The command syntax follows the Certify version in the notes. Record the actual CA FullName, template name, effective permissions and endpoint. Re-run without --hide-admins when inspecting administrative ACLs; the filtered view is not a complete security review.

shell
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Certify\Certify\bin\Release\Certify.exe enum-templates --template <TEMPLATE_NAME> --quiet

3. Select the path

FindingNext reference
Authentication-capable template plus requester-controlled identityESC1
Any Purpose or absent EKU restrictionsESC2
Enrollment-agent certificate and an accepting target templateESC3
Effective template modification rightsESC4
Relayable NTLM web enrollmentESC8
Access to a usable CA signing private keyGolden Certificates

An ESC label is a candidate configuration, not confirmation of impersonation. CA issuance, account mapping and service authorization are separate checks.

4. Useful EKUs

UsageOID
Client Authentication1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
Certificate Request Agent1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1
Any Purpose2.5.29.37.0
Server Authentication1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1

A certificate’s public key is not its private key. A certificate-only export is insufficient for the PFX authentication examples.

5. Certificate mapping matters

Current Windows DC enforcement requires strong certificate-to-account mapping. A chosen UPN alone is not proof that a certificate issued to one account will authenticate as another. Inspect the certificate SID extension and configured mappings when the lab’s UPN-only examples fail; do not assume that changing the UPN changes a CA-generated SID binding. See Microsoft KB5014754.

Quick checklist

text
[ ] Enumerate CAs and record FullName, trust and enrollment endpoints.
[ ] Enumerate published templates and effective enrollment permissions.
[ ] Check identity controls, EKUs, approval and authorized signatures.
[ ] Inspect template ACLs separately from CA permissions.
[ ] Select an attack path only after validating all prerequisites.
[ ] Verify issuance and KDC acceptance as distinct outcomes.